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Abstract. This paper introduces a simple alternative to the hash-and-sign paradigm,
from the security point of view but for signing short messages, called twinning. A twin
signature is obtained by signing twice a short message by a signature scheme. Analysis
of the concept in dierent settings yields the following results:
{ We prove that no generic algorithm can eciently forge a twin DSA signature.
Although generic algorithms oer a less stringent form of security than compu-
tational reductions in the standard model, such successful proofs still produce
positive evidence in favor of the correctness of the new paradigm.
{ We prove in standard model an equivalence between the hardness of producing ex-
istential forgeries (even under adaptively chosen message attacks) of a twin version
of a signature scheme proposed by Gennaro, Halevi and Rabin and the Flexible
RSA Problem.
We consequently regard twinning as an interesting alternative to hash functions for
eradicating existential forgery in signature schemes.
Keywords: Digital Signatures, Provable Security, Discrete Logarithm, Generic Model,
Flexible RSA Problem, Standard Model.
1 Introduction
The well-known hash and sign paradigm has two distinct goals: increasing performance
by reducing the size of the signed message and improving security by preventing exis-
tential forgeries. As a corollary, hashing remains mandatory even for short messages.
From the conceptual standpoint, the use of hash functions comes at the cost of
extra assumptions such as the conjecture that for all practical purposes, concrete func-
tions can be identied with ideal black boxes [3] or that under certain circumstances
(black box groups [15,21]) a new group element must necessarily come from the addi-
tion of two already known elements. In some settings [11] both models are even used
simultaneously.
This paper investigates a simple substitute to hashing that we call twinning. A twin
signature is obtained by signing twice the same (short) raw message by a probabilistic
signature scheme, or two probabilistically related messages.
We believe that this simple paradigm is powerful enough to eradicate existential
forgery in a variety of contexts. To support this claim, we show that no generic al-
gorithm can eciently forge a twin DSA signature and prove that for a twin variant
of a signature scheme proposed by Gennaro, Halevi and Rabin [8] (hereafter GHR)
existential forgery, even under an adaptively chosen-message attack, is equivalent to
the Flexible RSA Problem [5] in the standard model.
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2 Digital Signature Schemes
Let us begin with a quick review of denitions and security notions for digital signa-
tures. Digital signature schemes are the electronic version of handwritten signatures
for digital documents: a user's signature on a message m is a string which depends
on m, on public and secret data specic to the user and{possibly{on randomly chosen
data, in such a way that anyone can check the validity of the signature by using public
data only. The user's public data are called the public key, whereas his secret data are
called the secret key. The intuitive security notion would be the impossibility to forge
user's signatures without the knowledge of his secret key. In this section, we give a
more precise denition of signature schemes and of the possible attacks against them
(most of those denitions are based on [9]).
2.1 Denitions
A signature scheme is dened by the three following algorithms:
{ The key generation algorithm G. On input 1k, where k is the security parame-
ter, the algorithm G produces a pair (kp;ks) of matching public and secret keys.
Algorithm G is probabilistic.
{ The signing algorithm . Given a message m and a pair of matching public and
secret keys (kp;ks),  produces a signature . The signing algorithm might be
probabilistic.
{ The verication algorithm V . Given a signature , a message m and a public
key kp, V tests whether  is a valid signature of m with respect to kp. In general,
the verication algorithm need not be probabilistic.
2.2 Forgeries and Attacks
In this subsection, we formalize some security notions which capture the main practical
situations. On the one hand, the goals of the adversary may be various:
{ Disclosing the secret key of the signer. It is the most serious attack. This attack
is termed total break.
{ Constructing an ecient algorithm which is able to sign messages with good
probability of success. This is called universal forgery.
{ Providing a new message-signature pair. This is called existential forgery.
In many cases this latter forgery, the existential forgery, is not dangerous, because the
output message is likely to be meaningless. Nevertheless, a signature scheme which
is not existentially unforgeable (and thus that admits existential forgeries) does not
guarantee by itself the identity of the signer. For example, it cannot be used to certify
randomly looking elements, such as keys. Furthermore, it cannot formally guarantee
the non-repudiation property, since anyone may be able to produce a message with a
valid signature.
On the other hand, various means can be made available to the adversary, help-
ing her into her forgery. We focus on two specic kinds of attacks against signature
schemes: the no-message attacks and the known-message attacks. In the rst scenario,
the attacker only knows the public key of the signer. In the second one, the attacker
has access to a list of valid message-signature pairs. According to the way this list was
created, we usually distinguish many subclasses, but the strongest is the adaptively3
chosen-message attack, where the attacker can ask the signer to sign any message of
her choice. She can therefore adapt her queries according to previous answers.
When one designs a signature scheme, one wants to computationally rule out exis-
tential forgeries even under adaptively chosen-message attacks, which is the strongest
security level for a signature scheme.
3 Generic Algorithms
Before we proceed, let us stress that although the generic model in which we analyze
DSA oers a somehow weaker form of security than the reductions that we apply to
GHR in the standard model, it still provides evidence that twinning may indeed have
a benecial eect on security.
Generic algorithms [15,21], as introduced by Nechaev and Shoup, encompass group
algorithms that do not exploit any special property of the encodings of group elements
other than the property that each group element is encoded by a unique string. Typ-
ically, algorithms like Pollard's  algorithm [18] fall under the scope of this formalism
while index-calculus methods do not.
3.1 The Framework
Recall that any Abelian nite group   is isomorphic to a product of cyclic groups of
the form (
￿
pk;+), where p is a prime. Such groups will be called standard Abelian
groups. An encoding of a standard group   is an injective map from   into a set of
bit-strings S.
We give some examples: consider the multiplicative group of invertible elements
modulo some prime q. This group is cyclic and isomorphic to the standard additive
group   =
￿
q 1. Given a generator g, an encoding  is obtained by computing the
binary representation (x) of gx mod q. The same construction applies when one con-
siders a multiplicative subgroup of prime order r. Similarly, let E be the group of
points of some non-singular elliptic curve over a nite eld
￿ , then E is either isomor-
phic to a (standard) cyclic group   or else is isomorphic to a product of two cyclic
groups
￿
d1 
￿
d2. In the rst case, given a generator G of E, an encoding is obtained
by computing (x) = x:G, where x:G denotes the scalar multiplication of G by the
integer x and providing coordinates for (x). The same construction applies when E is
replaced by one of its subgroups of prime order r. Note that the encoding set appears
much larger than the group size, but compact encodings using only one coordinate
and a sign bit 1 exist and for such encodings, the image of  is included in the
binary expansions of integers < tr for some small integer t, provided that r is close
enough to the size of the underlying eld
￿ . This is exactly what is recommended for
cryptographic applications [10].
A generic algorithm A over a standard Abelian group   is a probabilistic algorithm
that takes as input an encoding list f(x1);;(xk)g, where each xi is in  . While
it executes, the algorithm may consult an oracle for further encodings. Oracle calls
consist of triples fi;j;g, where i and j are indices of the encoding list and  is . The
oracle returns the string (xi  xj), according to the value of  and this bit-string is
appended to the list, unless it was already present. In other words, A cannot access an
element of   directly but only through its name (x) and the oracle provides names
for the sum or dierence of two elements addressed by their respective names. Note
however that A may access the list at any time. In many cases, A takes as input a4
pair f(1);(x)g. Probabilities related to such algorithms are computed with respect
to the internal coin tosses of A as well as the random choices of  and x.
The following theorem appears in [21]:
Theorem 1. Let   be a standard cyclic group of order N and let p be the largest
prime divisor of N. Let A be a generic algorithm over   that makes at most n queries
to the oracle. If x 2   and an encoding  are chosen at random, then the probability
that A returns x on input f(1);(x)g is O(n2=p).
Proof. We refer to [21] for a proof. However, we will need, as an ingredient for our own
proofs, the probabilistic model used by Shoup. We develop the model in the special
case where N is a prime number r, which is of interest to us. Alternatively, we could
work in a subgroup of prime order r.
Basically, we would like to identify the probabilistic space consisting of  and x
with the space Sn+2   , where S is the set of bit-string encodings. Given a tuple
fz1;;zn+2;yg in this space, z1 and z2 are used as (1) and (x), the successive zi
are used in sequence to answer the oracle queries and the unique value y from   serves
as x. However, this interpretation may yield inconsistencies as it does not take care of
possible collisions between oracle queries. To overcome the diculty, Shoup denes,
along with the execution of A, a sequence of linear polynomials Fi(X), with coecients
modulo r. Polynomials F1 and F2 are respectively set to F1 = 1 and F2 = X and the
denition of polynomial F` is related to the `-th query fi;j;g: F` = Fi  Fj, where
the sign  is chosen according to . If F` is already listed as a previous polynomial
Fh, then F` is marked and A is fed with the answer of the oracle at the h-th query.
Otherwise, z` is returned by the oracle. Once A has come to a stop, the value of x is
set to y.
It is easy to check that the behavior of the algorithm which plays with the poly-
nomials Fi is exactly similar to the behavior of the regular algorithm, if we require
that y is not a root of any polynomial Fi   Fj, where i, j range over indices of un-
marked polynomials. A sequence fz1;;zn+2;yg for which this requirement is met is
called a safe sequence. Shoup shows that, for any fz1;;zn+2g, the set of y such that
fz1;;zn+2;yg is not safe has probability O(n2=r). From a safe sequence, one can
dene x as y and  as any encoding which satises (Fi(y)) = zi, for all unmarked
Fi. This correspondence preserves probabilities. However, it does not completely cover
the sample space f;xg since executions such that Fi(x) = Fj(x), for some indices
i, j, such that Fi and Fj are not identical are omitted. To conclude the proof of the
above theorem in the special case where N is a prime number r, we simply note that
the output of a computation corresponding to a safe sequence fz1;;zn+2;yg does
not depend on y. Hence it is equal to y with only minute probability.
3.2 Digital Signatures over Generic Groups
We now explain how generic algorithms can deal with attacks against DSA-like sig-
nature schemes [6,20,16,10]. We do this by dening a generic version of DSA that
we call GDSA. Parameters for the signature include a standard cyclic group of prime
order r together with an encoding . The signer also uses as a secret key/public key
pair fx;(x)g. Note that we have chosen to describe signature generation as a regular
rather than generic algorithm, using a full description of . To sign a message m,
1 < m < r the algorithm executes the following steps:
1. Generate a random number u, 1  u < r.5
2. Compute c   (u) mod r. If c = 0 go to step 1.
3. Compute d   u 1(m + xc) mod r. If d = 0 go to step 1.
4. Output the pair fc;dg as the signature of m.
The verier, on the other hand, is generic:
1. If c 62 [1;r   1] or d 62 [1;r   1], output invalid and stop.
2. Compute h   d 1 mod r, h1   hm mod r and h2   hc mod r.
3. Obtain (h1 + h2x) from the oracle and compute c0   (h1 + h2x) mod r.
4. If c 6= c0 output invalid and stop otherwise output valid and stop.
The reader may wonder how the verier obtains the value of  requested at step 3.
This is simply achieved by mimicking the usual double-and-add algorithm and asking
the appropriate queries to the oracle. This yields (h1) and (h2x). A nal call to the
oracle completes the task.
A generic algorithm A can also perform forgery attacks against a signature scheme.
This is dened by the ability of A to return on input f(1);(x)g a triple fm;c;dg 2   3
for which the verier outputs valid. Here we assume that both algorithms are performed
at a stretch, keeping the same encoding list.
To deal with adaptive attacks one endows A with another oracle, called the signing
oracle. To query this oracle, the algorithm provides an element m 2  . The signing
oracle returns a valid signature fc;dg of m. Success of A is dened by its ability to
produce a valid triple f~ m;~ c; ~ dg, such that ~ m has not been queried during the attack.
Such a forgery can be easily performed against this GDSA scheme, even with just
a passive attack: the adversary chooses random numbers h1 and h2, 1  h1;h2 < r and
computes c   (h1 + h2x) mod r. Then it denes d = ch 1
2 mod r, h = d 1 mod r,
and eventually m = dh1 mod r. The triple fm;c;dg 2   3 is therefore a valid one,
unless c = 0, which is very unlikely.
4 The Security of Twin GDSA
4.1 A Theoretical Result
The above denitions extend to the case of twin signatures, by requesting the attacker
A to output an m and two distinct pairs fc;dg 2   2, fc0;d0g 2  2. Success is granted as
soon as the verifying algorithm outputs valid for both triples1. We prove the following:
Theorem 2. Let   be a standard cyclic group of prime order r. Let S be a set of bit-
string encodings of cardinality at least r, included in the set of binary representations
of integers < tr, for some t. Let A be a generic algorithm over   that makes at most
n queries to the oracle. If x 2   and an encoding  are chosen at random, then the
probability that A returns a message m together with two distinct GDSA signatures of
m on input f(1);(x)g is O(tn2=r).
Proof. We cover the non adaptive case and tackle the more general case after the
proof. We use the probabilistic model developed in section 3.1. Let A be a generic
attacker able to forge some m and two distinct signatures fc;dg and fc0;d0g. We assume
that, once these outputs have been produced, A goes on checking both signatures; we
estimate the probability that both are valid.
1 using [14] the simultaneous square-and-multiply generation or verication of two DSA signatures
is only 17% slower than the generation or verication of a single signature.6
We restrict our attention to behaviors of the full algorithm corresponding to safe
sequences fz1;;zn+2;yg. By this, we discard a set of executions of probability
O(n2=r). We let P be the polynomial (md 1) + (cd 1)X and Q be the polynomial
(md0 1) + (c0d0 1)X.
{ We rst consider the case where either P or Q does not appear in the Fi list
before the signatures are produced. If this happens for P, then P is included in
the Fi list at signature verication and the corresponding answer of the oracle is
a random number zi. Unless zi = c mod r, which is true with probability at most
t=r, the signature is invalid. A similar bound holds for Q.
{ We now assume that both P and Q appear in the Fi list before A outputs its
signatures. We let i denote the rst index such that Fi = P and j the rst
index such that Fj = Q. Note that both Fi and Fj are unmarked (as dened in
section 3.1). If i = j, then we obtain that md 1 = md0 1 and cd 1 = c0d0 1. From
this, it follows that c = c0, d = d0 and the signatures are not distinct.
{ We are left with the case where i 6= j. We let 
i;j, i < j, be the set of safe
sequences producing two signatures such that the polynomials P, Q, dened as
above appear for the rst time before the algorithm outputs the signatures, as Fi
and Fj. We consider a xed value w for fz1;;zj 1g and let ^ w be the set of safe
sequences extending w. We note that Fi and Fj are dened from w and we write
Fi = a+bX, Fj = a0+b0X. We claim that 
i;j\ ^ w has probability  t=r. To show
this, observe that one of the signatures that the algorithm outputs is necessarily
of the form fc;dg, with c = zi mod r, c = db mod r and m = da mod r. Now, the
other signature is fc0;d0g and since m is already dened we get d0 = ma0 1 mod r
and c0 = b0d0 mod r. This in turn denes zj mod r within a subset of at most t
elements. From this, the required bound follows and, from the bound, we infer
that the probability of 
i;j is at most t=r.
Summing up, we have bounded the probability that a safe sequence produces an
execution of A outputting two valid signatures by O(tn2=r). This nishes the proof.
In the proof, we considered the case of an attacker forging a message-signature pair
from scratch. A more elaborate scenario corresponds to an attacker who can adaptively
request twin signatures corresponding to messages of his choice. In other words, the
attacker interacts with the legitimate signer by submitting messages selected by its
program.
We show how to modify the security proof that was just given to cover the adaptive
case. We assume that each time it requests a signature the attacker A immediately
veries the received signature. We also assume that the verication algorithm is nor-
malized in such a way that, when verifying a signature fc;dg of a message m, it asks
for ((md 1) + (cd 1)x) after a xed number of queries, say q. We now explain how
to simulate signature generation: as before, we restrict our attention to behaviors of
the algorithm corresponding to safe sequences fz1;;zn+2;yg. When the (twin) sig-
nature of m is requested at a time of the computation when the encoding list contains
i elements, one picks zi+q and zi+2q and manufactures the two signatures as follows:
1. Let c   zi+q mod r, pick d at random.
2. Let c0   zi+2q mod r, pick d0 at random.
3. Output fc;dg and fc0;d0g as the rst and second signatures.7
While verifying both signatures, A will receive the elements zi+q and zi+2q, as
((md 1) + (cd 1)x) and ((md0 1) + (c0d0 1)x)
respectively, unless Fi+q or Fi+2q appears earlier in the Fi list. Due to the randomness
of d and d0, this happens with very small probability bounded by n=r. Altogether, the
simulation is spotted with probability O(n2=r) which does not aect the O(tn2=r)
bound for the probability of successful forgery.
4.2 Practical Meaning of the Result
We have shown that, in the setting of generic algorithms, existential forgery against
twin GDSA has a minute success probability. Of course this does not tell anything on
the security of actual twin DSA. Still, we believe that our proof has some practical
meaning. The analogy with hash functions and the random oracle model [3] is inspir-
ing: researchers and practitioners are aware that proofs in the random oracle model
are not proofs but a mean to spot design aws and validate schemes that are sup-
ported by such proofs. Still, all standard signature schemes that have been proposed
use specic functions which are not random by denition; our proofs seem to indi-
cate that if existential forgery against twin DSA is possible, it will require to dig into
structural properties of the encoding function. This is of some help for the design of
actual schemes: for example, the twin DSA described in Appendix A allows signature
with message recovery without hashing and without any form of redundancy, while
keeping some form of provable security. This might be considered a more attractive
approach than [17] or [1], the former being based on redundancy and the latter on
random oracles. We believe that twin DSA is even more convincing in the setting of
elliptic curves, where there are no known ways of taking any advantage of the encoding
function.
5 An RSA-based Twinning in the Standard Model
The twin signature scheme described in this section belongs to the (very) short list
of ecient schemes provably secure in the standard model: in the sequel, we show
that producing existential forgeries even under an adaptively chosen-message attack
is equivalent to solving the Flexible RSA Problem [5].
Security in the standard model implies no ideal assumptions; in other words we
directly reduce the Flexible RSA Problem to a forgery. As a corollary, we present an
ecient and provably secure signature scheme that does not require any hash function.
Furthermore, the symmetry provided by twinning is much simpler to analyze than
Cramer-Shoup's proposal [5] which achieves a similar security level, and similar e-
ciency, with a rather intricate proof.
5.1 Gennaro-Halevi-Rabin Signatures
In [8] Gennaro, Halevi and Rabin present the following signature scheme: Let n be an
`-bit RSA modulus [19], H a hash-function and y 2
￿ ?
n. The pair fn;yg is the signer's
public key, whose secret key is the factorization of n.
{ To sign m, the signer hashes e   H(m) (which is very likely to be co-prime with
'(n)) and computes the e-th root of y modulo n using the factorization of n:
s   y1=e mod n8
{ To verify a given fm;sg, the verier checks that
sH(m) mod n
? = y:
Security relies on the Strong RSA Assumption. Indeed, if H outputs elements that
contain at least a new prime factor, existential forgery is impossible. Accordingly, Gen-
naro et al. dene a new property that H must satisfy to yield secure signatures: division
intractability. Division intractability means that it is computationally impossible to
nd a1, ..., ak and b such that H(b) divides the product of all the H(ai). In [8], it is
conjectured that such functions exist and heuristic conversions from collision-resistant
into division-intractable functions are shown (see also [4]).
Still, security against adaptively chosen-message attacks requires the hash function
H to either behave like a random oracle model or achieve the chameleon property [12].
This latter property, for a hash function, provides a trapdoor which helps to nd second
preimages, even with some xed part. Indeed, some signatures can be pre-computed,
but with specic exponents before outputting y: y = x
￿
i ei mod n for random primes
ei = H(mi;ri).
Using the chameleon property, for the i-th query m to the signing oracle, the
simulator who knows the trapdoor can get an r such that H(mi;ri) = H(m;r) = ei.
In the random oracle model, one simply denes H(m;r)   ei.
Then s = x
￿
j6=i ej = y1=ei mod n and the signature therefore consists of the triple
fm;r;sg satisfying
sH(m;r) = y mod n:
Cramer and Shoup [5] also proposed a scheme based on the Strong RSA Assump-
tion, the rst practical signature scheme to be secure in the standard model, but with
universal one-way hash functions; our twin scheme will be similar but with a nice sym-
metry in the description (which helps for the security analysis) and no hash-functions,
unless one wants to sign a long message.
5.2 Preliminaries
We build our scheme in two steps. The rst scheme resists existential forgeries when
subjected to no-message attacks. Twinning will immune it against adaptively chosen-
message attacks.
Injective function into the prime integers. Before any description, we will as-
sume the existence of a function p with the following properties: given a security
parameter k (which will be the size of the signed messages), p maps any string from
f0;1gk into the set of the prime integers, p is also designed to be easy to compute and
injective. A candidate is proposed and analyzed in Appendix B.
The Flexible RSA Problem and the Strong RSA Assumption. Let us also
recall the Flexible RSA Problem [5]. Given an RSA modulus n and an element y 2
￿ ?
n,
nd any exponent e > 1, together with an element x such that xe = y mod n.
The Strong RSA Assumption is the conjecture that this problem is intractable
for large moduli. This was independently introduced by [2,7], and then used in many
further security analyses (e.g. [5,8]).9
5.3 A First GHR Variant
The rst scheme is very similar to GHR without random oracles but with function p
instead:
{ To sign m 2 f0;1gk, the signer computes e   p(m) and the e-th root of y modulo
n using the factorization of n
s   y1=e mod n
{ To verify a given fm;sg, the verier checks that
sp(m) mod n
? = y:
Since p provides a new prime for each new message (injectivity), existential forgery
contradicts the Strong RSA Assumption. However, how can we deal with adaptively
chosen-message attacks without any control over the output of the function p, which
is a publicly dened non-random oracle and not a trapdoor function either?
5.4 The Twin Version
The nal scheme is quite simple since it consists in duplicating the previous one: the
signer uses two `-bit RSA moduli n1, n2 and two elements y1, y2 in
￿ ?
n1 and
￿ ?
n2
respectively. Secret keys are the prime factors of the ni.
{ To sign a message m, the signer probabilistically derives two messages 1;2 2
f0;1gk, (from m and a random tape !), computes ei   p(i) and then the ei-th
root of yi modulo ni, for i = 1;2, using the factorization of the moduli:
fs1   y
1=e1
1 mod n1;s2   y
1=e2
2 mod n2g
{ To verify a given fm;!;s1;s2g, the verier computes 1 and 2, then checks that
s
p(i)
i mod ni
? = yi, for i = 1;2.
To prevent forgeries, a new message must involve a new exponent, either e1 or e2,
which never occurred in the signatures provided by the signing oracle. Therefore, a
rst requirement is that 1 and 2 dene at most one message m, but only if they
have been correctly constructed. Thus, some redundancy is furthermore required.
We thus suggest the following derivation, to get 1 and 2 from m 2 f0;1gk=2
(we assume k to be even): one chooses two random elements a;b 2 f0;1gk=2, then
1 = (m  a)jj(m  b) and 2 = ajjb.
Clearly, given 1 and 2, one gets back M = 1  2, which provides a valid
message if and only if the redundancy holds: M = M, where S and S denote the two
k=2-bit halves of a k-bit string S, the most signicant and the least signicant parts
respectively.
5.5 Existential Forgeries
Let us show that existential forgery of the twin scheme, with above derivation process,
leads to a new solution of the Flexible RSA Problem:10
Lemma 3. After q queries to the signing oracle, the probability that there exist a new
message m and values a;b, which lead to 1 = (m  a)jj(m  b) and 2 = ajjb, such
that both e1 = p(1) and e2 = p(2) already occurred in the signatures provided by the
signing oracle is less than q2=2k=2.
Proof. Let fmi;ai;bi;s1;i;s2;ig denote the answers of the signing oracle. Using the
injectivity of p, the existence of such m, a and b means that there exist indices i and
j for which
(m  a)jj(m  b) = 1 = 1;i = (mi  ai)jj(mi  bi)
ajjb = 2 = 2;j = ajjjbj:
Then
a  b = (m  a)  (m  b) = (mi  ai)  (mi  bi) = ai  bi;
and
a  b = aj  bj:
Therefore, for a j > i (the case i > j is similar), the new random elements aj;bj must
satisfy aj bj = aibi. Since it is randomly chosen by the signer, the probability that
this occurs for some i < j is less than (j   1)=2k=2.
Altogether, the probability that for some j there exists some i < j which satises
the above equality is less that q2=2  2 k=2. By symmetry, we obtain the same result
if we exchange i and j.
The probability that both exponents already appeared is consequently smaller
than q2=2k=2.
To prevent adaptively chosen-message attacks, we need no trapdoor property for
p, nor random oracle assumption either. We simply give the factorization of one mod-
ulus to the simulator, which can use any pre-computed exponentiation with any new
message, as when chameleon functions are used [8].
5.6 Adaptively Chosen-Message Attacks
Indeed, to prevent adaptively chosen-message attacks, one just needs to describe a
simulator; our simulator works as follows:
{ The simulator is rst given the moduli n1;n2 and the elements y1 2
￿ ?
n1, y2 2
￿ ?
n2, as well as the factorization of n, where  is randomly chosen in f1;2g. To
simplify notations we assume that  = 1. And the following works without loss
of generality since the derivation of 1 and 2 is perfectly symmetric: they are
randomly distributed, but satisfy 1  2 = mjjm (it is a perfect secret sharing).
{ The simulator randomly generates q values e2;j   p(2;j), with randomly chosen
2;j 2R f0;1gk for j = 1;:::;q and computes
z   y
￿
j=1;:::;q e2;j
2 mod n2:
The new public key for the signature scheme is the following: the moduli n1;n2
with the elements y1;z in
￿ ?
n1 and
￿ ?
n2 respectively.
{ For the j-th signed message m, the simulator rst gets (ajjb)   (mjjm)  2;j. It
therefore computes 1   ajjb, and thus 2   2;j = (m  a)jj(m  b).
Then, it knows s2 = y
￿
i6=j e2;i
2 mod n2, and computes s1 using the factorization of
n1.11
Such a simulator can simulate up to q signatures, which leads to the following
theorem.
Theorem 4. Let us consider an adversary against the twin-GHR scheme who suc-
ceeds in producing an existential forgery, with probability greater than ", after q adap-
tive queries to the signing oracle in time t, then the Flexible RSA Problem can be
solved with probability greater than "0 within a time bound t0, where
"0 =
1
2

"  
q2
2k=2

and t0 = t + O(q  `2  k):
Proof. Note that the above bounds are almost optimal since "0  = "=2 and t0  = 2t.
Indeed, the time needed to produce an existential forgery after q signature queries is
already in O(q  (jn1j2 + jn2j2)k). To evaluate the success probability, q is less than
say 240, but k may be taken greater than 160 bits (and even much more).
To conclude the proof, one just needs to address the random choice of . As we
have seen in Lemma 3, with probability greater than " q2=2k=2, one of the exponents
in the forgery never appeared before. Since  is randomly chosen and the view of the
simulation is perfectly independent of this choice, with probability of one half, e = e 
is new. Let us follow our assumption that  = 1, then
se = se
2 = z = y
2 mod n2;
where  =
Q
j=1;:::;q e2;j. Since e is new, it is relatively prime with , and therefore,
there exist u and v such that ue + v = 1: let us dene x = yu
2sv mod n2,
xe = (yu
2sv)e = y1 v
2 sev = y2(y
2) v(se)v = y2 mod n2:
We thus obtain an e-th root of the given y2 modulo n2, for a new prime e.
5.7 More Signatures
One may remark that the length of the messages we can sign with above construction
is limited to k=2 bits, because of the required redundancy. But one can increase the
size, by signing three derived messages: in order to sign m 2 f0;1gk, one chooses
two random elements a;b 2 f0;1gk=2 (we still assume k to be even), and signs with
dierent moduli
1 = m  (ajjb)
2 = ajjb
3 = m  (bjja):
6 Conclusion and Further Research
We proposed an alternative to the well-known hash-and-sign paradigm, based on the
simple idea of signing twice (or more) identical or related short messages. We believe
that our rst investigations show that this is a promising strategy, deserving further
study.
A number of interesting questions remain open. First, from the eciency point of
view, which is a frequent concern, we are aware that the current proposals do not deal
with either the computational cost, or the communication load, in an ecient way.12
Thus, for example, can the number of elds in a twin DSA be reduced from four (fc;dg
and fc0;d0g) to three or less? Can we also suppress some elds in the twin-GHR, or
sign k-bit long messages with only two signatures?
Finally, can an increase in the number of signatures (e.g. three instead of two)
yield better security bounds?
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A Twin Signatures with Message Recovery
In this appendix, we describe a twin version of the Nyberg-Rueppel scheme [17] which
provides message recovery. Keeping the notations of section 4.1:
1. Generate a random number u, 1  u < r.13
2. Compute c   (u) + m mod r. If c = 0 go to step 1.
3. Compute an integer d   u   cx mod r.
4. Output the pair fc;dg as the signature.
In the above, f is what is called in [10] a message with appendix. It simply means
that it has an adequate redundancy. The corresponding verication is performed by
the following (generic) steps:
1. If c 62 [1;r   1] or d 62 [0;r   1], output invalid and stop.
2. Obtain (d + cx) from the oracle and compute    (d + cx) mod r .
3. Check the redundancy of m   c    mod r. If incorrect output invalid and stop;
otherwise output the reconstructed message m, output valid and stop.
In the twin setting, signature generation is alike but is performed twice, so as
to output two distinct signatures. However, no redundancy is needed. The verier
simply checks that the signatures are distinct and outputs two successive versions of
the message, say m and m0. It returns valid if m
? = m0 and invalid otherwise. The
security proof is sketched here, we leave the discussion of adaptive attacks to the
reader.
We keep the notations and assumptions of section 4 and let A be a generic attacker
over   which outputs, on input f(1);(x)g, two signature pairs fc;dg, fc0;d0g and
runs the verifying algorithm that produces from these signatures two messages m, m0
and checks whether they are equal. We wish to show that, if x 2   and an encoding
 are chosen at random, then the probability that m = m0 is O(tn2=r).
As before, we restrict our attention to behaviors of the full algorithm corresponding
to safe sequences fz1;;zn;yg. We let P, Q be the polynomials d+cX and d0+c0X.
We rst consider the case where either P or Q does not appear in the Fi list before
the signatures are produced. If this happens for P, then, P is included in the Fi list at
signature verication and the corresponding answer of the oracle is a random number
zi. Since m is computed as c   zi mod r, the probability that m = m0 is bounded by
t=r. A similar bound holds for Q.
We now assume that both P and Q appear in the Fi list before A outputs its
signatures. We let i denote the rst index such that Fi = P and j the rst index such
that Fj = Q. Note that both Fi and Fj are unmarked (as dened in section 3.1). If
i = j, then we obtain that c = c0 and d = d0. From this, it follows that the signatures
are not distinct.
As in section 4, we are left with the case where i 6= j and we dene 
i;j, i < j, to
be the set of safe sequences producing two signatures such that the polynomials P, Q,
dened as above appear for the rst time before the algorithm outputs the signatures,
as Fi and Fj. We show that, for any xed value w = fz1;;zj 1g, 
i;j \ ^ w has
probability  t=r, where ^ w is dened as above. Since we have m = c   zi mod r and
m0 = c0   zj mod r, we obtain zj = c0   c + zi mod r, from which the upper bound
follows. From this bound, we obtain that the probability of 
i;j is at most t=r and,
taking the union of the various 
i;js, we conclude that the probability to obtain a
valid twin signature is at most O(tn2=r).14
B The Choice of Function p
B.1 A Candidate
The following is a natural candidate:
p : f0;1gk ! P
m 7! nextprime(m  2)
where  is suitably chosen to guarantee the existence of a prime in any set [m 
2;(m + 1)  2[, for m < 2k.
Note that the deterministic property of nextprime is not mandatory, one just
needs it to be injective. But then, the preimage must be easily recoverable from the
prime: the exponent is sent as the signature, from which one checks the primality and
extracts the message (message-recovery).
B.2 Analysis
It is clear that any generator of random primes, using m as a seed, can be considered
as a candidate for p. The function proposed above is derived from a technique for
accelerating prime generation called incremental search (e.g. [13], page 148).
1. Input: an odd k-bit number n0 (derived from m)
2. Test the s numbers n0, n0 + 2, ..., n0 + 2(s   1) for primality
Under reasonable number-theoretic assumptions, if s = cln2k, the probability of
failure of this technique is smaller than 2e 2c, for large k.
Using our notations, in such a way that there exists at least a prime in any set
[m  2;(m + 1)  2[, but with probability smaller than 2 80, we obtain from above
formulae that c  = 40, and 2  40ln2k++1. Therefore, a suitable candidate is   =
5log2 k, and less than 20k primality tests have to be performed.
B.3 Extensions
Collision-resistance: To sign large messages (at the cost of extra assumptions),
one can of course use any collision-resistant hash-function h before signing (using the
classical hash-and-sign technique). Clearly, the new function m 7! p(h(m)) is not
mathematically injective, but just computationally injective (which is equivalent to
collision-resistance), which is enough for the proof.
Division intractability: If one wants to improve eciency, using the division-
intractability conjecture proposed in [8], any function that outputs k-bit strings can
be used instead of p. More precisely:
Denition 5 (Division Intractability). A function H is said (n;;)-division in-
tractable if any adversary which runs in time  cannot nd, with probability greater
than , a set of elements a1, ..., an and b such that H(b) divides the product of all
the H(ai).
As above, that function p would not be injective, but just collision-resistant, which
is enough to prove the following:15
Theorem 6. Let us consider the twin-GHR scheme where p is any (q;";t)-division-
intractable hash function. Let us assume that an adversary A succeeds in producing an
existential forgery under an adaptively chosen-message attack within time t and with
probability greater than ", after q queries to the signing oracle. Then one can either
contradict the division-intractability assumption or solve the Flexible RSA Problem
with probability greater than "0 within a time bound t0, where
"0 =
1
2

"  
q2
2k=2

and t0 = t + O(q  `2  k):